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Article 13

Human Life Begins:
Integrated Senate Report
Rev . Theodore Hall, O.P., S.T.D.
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at various other colleges, both
before and after obtaining his
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Introduction
Notwithstanding overly dramatized presentation by TV and other
media to keep alive the question about the precise time when each
human life begins, the so-called controversy has ended. Actually, "the
scientific consensus on the biological fact of the beginning of each
human life has existed ever since the medical and scientific communities became aware of the progress of conception in the mid-nineteenth
century." This affirmation, based upon exhaustive evidence from
professional testimony, was made available to the public in January,
1982, following a subcommittee's report to the U.S. Senate on the
Human Life Bill, S 158. 1
Upon studying this " report," it becomes clear that the evidence
presented from the physical sciences (which, accurately or
inaccurately, are often called empirical or experimental) ought to be
integrated with the same teachings set forth by sound philosophy,
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because there is little doubt that these sciences, each within the limitations of its own objectives, have sooner or later arrived at the same
valid conclusions.
Basic Facts of Report
It is of no small interest that, of the 57 witnesses who testified,

J

including world-renowned geneticists, biologists, and practicing physicians, 11 testified in support of the bill (HLB-SI58) and 11 were in
opposition to it. Nevertheless, their judgment on the bill had nothing
to do with the precise element of when life begins. " The testimony of
these witnesses and the voluminous submissions received by the subcommittee demonstrate that contemporary scientific evidence points
to a clear conclusion: the life of a human being begins at co nception;
the time when the process of fertilization is complete." 2
Among the testimonies, one can recognize an ever-increasing importance both with regard to the authority of the witnesses and the
contents verified.
For example, Dr. Jerome Lejeune of the Universite Rene Descartes
in Paris, discoverer of the chromosomal disease which causes
mongolism, testified that "(l)ife has a very, very long history, but each
individual has a very neat beginning - the moment of its conception
(hearings on S158, April 23 transcript, p. 18) .3
~
"Similarly, Dr. Watson Bowes, Professor of Obstetrics and Gyneco l(
ogy at the University of Colorado School of Medicine, stated, 'If we
I
are talking, then, about the biological beginning of a human life or
\
lives, as distinct from other human lives, the answer is most assuredly
that it is at the time of conception - that is to say, the time at which
a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm (p. 61) .... This
straightforward biological fact should not be distorted to serve sociological, political, or economic goals' (p. 65). 4
"Dr. Hymie Gordon, Professor of Medical Genetics and physician at
th e Mayo Clinic, affirmed this consensus and recognized the
distinction between the scientific question and the value question: 'I
think we can now also say that the question of the beginning of
life - when life begins - is no longer a question for theological or
philosophical dispute. It is an established scientific fact. Theologians
)
and philosophers may go on to debate the meaning of life or the
purpose of life, but it is an established fact that all life, including
human life, begins at the moment of conception' (pp. 31,32).
"Dr. Gordon further observed: ' I have never ever seen in my own
scientific reading, long before I became concerned with issues of life
of this nature, that anyone has ever argued that life did not begin at
the moment of conception and that it was a human conception if it \ '
resulted from the fertilization of the human egg by a human sperm. As
far as I know , these have never been argued against' " (p. 52).5

I
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Especially valuable is the following formulation of the material
under consideration. " Dr. Micheline Matthew-Roth, a principal
research associate in the Department of Medicine at the Harvard Medical School, after·.reviewing the scientific literature on the question of
when the life of a human being begins, concluded her statement with
these words: 'So, therefore, it is scientifically correct to say that an
individual human life begins at conception, when egg and sperm join
to form the zygote, and that this developing human always is a
member of our species in all stages of its life' " (pp. 41, 42).6
This formulation emphasizes the important points that 1) not only
is there life from the first moment of fertilization (conception) but,
2) it is a human life, 3) belonging to an individual, 4) a member of the
species man (homo sapiens), 5) who must be classified as hum an from
fertilization and throughout all its stages of life. And it was with this
understanding, and an even deeper one, as will become evident, that
the Report presented its convictions to the Senate in a step-by-step
procedure matching the teachings of the philosophical sciences.
Integrating Philosophy with the Report

J

Through the ages, at least scholastic philosophy has rigorously
maintained its notions of the above enunciated terms, such as living
(life), human nature, species, individual, essence (same through all its
stages of life) . The reason for this is t hat the core of the problem as to
when an individual human life begins rests beyond everything else
upon the certitude of what essentially constitu tes the nature of man,
thereby distinguishing a human being as such from any other species
of animal.
1) "Life" begins at fertilization:
The term " living" is adequately studied in the " philosophy of
nature" where the living, having been set apart from the nonliving, is
said to be alive, not because of the body but because of the life-giving
principle within the body. This life-giving principle in any organic
body is called the soul. Even historically, the human embryo in its
earliest stages was said to be alive and, therefore, to have q soul. But,
in those early days, since embryos were difficu~t to obt~in', '~ll1d even
more difficult to examine minutely, since man posse'ssect ' only crude
scientific instruments, the soul probably was thought to be only
vegetative, initially. This opinion that the human embryo first
possessed a vegetative soul, then a sensitive soul, then a human soul
(three soul theory), held by Aquinas on the authority of Aristotle's
teaching on matter and form, had to yield before the greater certainty
of modern embryology. 7
Modern embryology has uncovered human characteristics in the
embryo as early as three weeks postovulation. Such characteristics
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include heartbeat, arm and leg buds, shoulder segments, spinal column
nerves, etc. 8 These developing characteristics may not possess the
ultimate perfections of a fully developed human body, but they are
identifiable as different from every other species of animal. Hence, the
science of embryology does.not hesitate to classify these facts under a
study of the "human" embryo. Neither does the Senate Report hesitate to conclude this section of the testimonies with the formulation
which states: " individual human life begins at conception ... . that
this developing human always is a member of our species in all stages
of life." 9
A brief but necessary digression must be made here because of
unreliable and misleading publications relative to the "three soul
theory" and abortion. One pUblication states: " But St. Thomas
Aquinas thought that the soul was not infused until the embryo was
formed. He wrote that no human being exists during the ear ly period
of gestation and only when the fetus had attained human shape and
human organs could it have a human soul. He believed therefore t hat
abortion during the early period should be permitted." 10
We ourselves verified by way of locus the first part of this statement
that Aquinas opted for Aristotle's idea of the three soul t heory. We
might also note that Aquinas's principle, that the human soul is
present when the embryo (fetus for him) has attained human shape
and human organs, has been upheld by mod ern embryology. At least
modern embryology and the Report have said such an embryo is
"human."
We find it quite unrealistic, however, for authors to draw t he con·
clusion that Aquinas therefore permitted abortion in the early period
of gestation. It would have been most convenient had the authors
referred to the locus of St. Thomas's teaching. Likewise, this rendition
of his teaching must hardly be of recent vintage since, as Austin
Fagothey, S.J. also notes: "Aristotle (On the Generation of Animals,
bk. II, ch. 3) thought that the embryo does not becom e human until
some time after conception, and this may be why he saw no wrong in
early abortion. St. Thomas ( Summa Th eo logica, I, q. 118, a. 2 r eply
to obj. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. II, ch. 89) accepted Aristotle's
opinion as a probablr. physical theory but drew no such ethical conclusion." 11
Anyone familiar with Thomistic principles would hardly hold that,
under the supposition that the early embryo or fetus did not have a
human soul, it would not be a grave crime again st nature to destroy
what nature intended to become a hum an being. Would anyone who
planted grass seed be content with a settlement in law which allowed a
perpetrator who unearthed the seed to be easily dismissed, simp ly
because what was destroyed had not yet, in fulfillment of nature,
become grass?
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2) It is a "human being's" life.
As we return to our original priorities, the Report acknowledged
that against the broad consensus supporting "human life begins at
fertilization," there are those who deny knowing when a "human" life
begins. 12 This apparent- contradiction was resolved by the subcommittee when it noted that the opposing statements were
extremely subjective, basing this position upon the "humanness" or
value attributed to the living organism. "They took the view that each
person may define as 'human' only those beings whose lives that person wants to value. Because they did not wish to accord intrinsic
worth to the lives of unborn children, they refused to call them
'human beings,' regardless of the scientific evidence." 13 Philosophically, one could hardly find serious fault with the operating definition
of a "human being" as presented by the subcommittee itself: "The
customary meaning of 'human being' is an individual being who is
human, i.e., of the human species." 14

I ,

3) It is an "individual" human being.

•

Confusion must also arise at times between the perpetuation of all
human life and the beginning of an "individual" human life. Definite
signs of this occur in the clarification given by Dr. Jerome Lejeune (in
early testimonies) when he says: "(l)ife has a very, very long history,
but each individual has a very neat beginning - the moment of conception."
The confusion is especially manifest in the minority views of Sen.
Max Baucus which, of course, the subcommittee did not accept. "Dr.
James Ebert, President of the Carnegie Institution, while objecting to
certain terminology - 'narrow definition of "actual human life," for
human life cannot properly be said to begin at any single moment
fixed in time' - objected on the basis that 'human life is a continuum,
proceeding generation after generation .... These eggs like the other
cells of the woman's body are living. The sperm maturing in the
human male are no less alive. The union of living egg and living sperm
results in a living zygote, no less alive than its parental predecessors,
but differing from both of them.' " 15 Implicit in this statement, however, is that Dr. Ebert must realize that it is a new "individual" upon
whom we are concentrating.
A statement even more difficult to understand is this: "Dr. Robert
Ebert, President of the Milbank Memorial Fund and former Dean of
Harvard Medical School wrote the Subcommittee as follows: 'I know
of no " ... current medical and scientific data ... " that supports the
contention" ... that human life in the sense of an actual human being
or legal person begins at conception." Life in the biological sense does
not begin the moment that an ovum is fertilized by a sperm, since
both have life prior to that event.' " 16 We seriously doubt that either
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of t h e above m embers of the m edical profession would expect us to
conclude t hat the ovum by itself o r the sperm by itself, because each
is alive, is each a human being. The "scientific consensus " of t h e
sub co mmittee is expressed more accurately, in the testimonies already
no ted as to where and whe n a new " ind ividual" hum an being is said to
be alive.
In a very practical way, test tube (in vitro) fertilization is und ertaken because science is aware of when an "individu al" human life
begins, hence, " The biological consensu s that conception marks t he
beginning of the life of a human being has recently b een confirmed by
th e process of creating a n ew hum an life outside t he mother, the 'test
tub e baby.' " (See testi m ony of Dr. L ejeune, H earings on S153, April
23 transcript, pp. 22, 23. ) 17 The test tube m eth od, fr om pre-fertilization through fertilization to implantation in t h e uterus, m eticu lo usly
calculates the origin of a new, actu al, "individual" hum an being. The
fact t h at t his fertilization takes place in a glass dish rather than in a
Fallop ian tube doesn 't cha nge the essential human nature which is
produced, any more t h an the germination of a seed in a nursery,
rather t han in a forest, m akes it essentially less a t ree. The scien ce of
botany readily grasps the difference between what essentially constitutes a species and its various accidental changes. "Nor are plants
static in form - they change as t h ey grow. A plant is different not
only from season to season, but from seed a nd seed lings to frui t ing,
and from bud to blossoming. In fact, a plant really has four dim ensions: t he three which we see when looking at it, and a fourth
one - time. The complet e plant is a manifestation of a seri es of stages
of growth. An acorn is as much an oak as is the maj estic fo rest t ree,
and the leafless tree in winter is, botanically speaking, ju st the sam e as
the t ree in full leaf or in splendid autumn color - all are on ly t im e
variants of the same species." 18
Another way, perhaps superfluous, of giving clari ty to t he above
confusion of the notion of life in general and in th e individual is
contained in philosophy's concep t of the "individual." " The individual or the individual thing is the concrete b earer of a n essence in its
non-communicable particularity, as this pine t ree or thi s man Peter.
The individual stands in contrast to the universal or t he essence which
abstracts from every definite bearer and as su ch ca n be communicated
to different subjects or carriers. Only the individu al rea lly exists o utside of th e mind, while the universal as such ex ists only in co nceptual
thinking. 'Individual' is a Latin word which means literally: t h e
undivided." 19 Hence, the " individual" is radically differe nt from
either the universal abstraction or even the m eani ng of life in general.
Since individuality is said of an actual singu lar living human being
established in its concrete reality, the question has often arisen as to
how t his can happen at the moment of fertilization, sin ce at a later
tim e the cells on occasion split, and twin births result. " One witness
258

Linac re Quarterly

, ,II

j

.

I
•

•

testified that cases in which twins arise from a single embryo suggest
that the individual has not yet been ' stably constituted' until the point
when twinning occurs " (testimony of Dr. Clifford Grobstein, Hearings
on S158, May 20 transcript, p. 19). "But even in such ex ceptional
cases of 'homozygous' twins, there is a being in existence from
co nception who is alive and human. That we can describe the formation of twins merely emphasizes that even at the earliest stages after
conception we can have scientific knowledge of t he existence of
distinct, individual human beings. " 20
We wonder if the biological process in twinning isn 't simply another
example of how nature reproduces from other individu als without
destroying that person's or persons' individuality. Simply because
modern embryology hasn't discovered the h ow of the reality doesn't
mean that there isn't an answer to the fa ct. It is quite evident that
man and woman accomplish the production of an individual without
destroying their own individuality. This is accomplished in the generative act: living materials are separated from the individual parents
without destroying their individuality. Human reproduction is even
accomplished without the generative a ct, by means of uniting the
materials in a glass dish - test tube babies. There are even those who
think the duplication of individuals with identical ch aracteristic s
might be possible by way of cloning. In all su ch endeavors, whenever
the matter for a human body is accessible, a new individua l becomes
capable of existence. This was originally d enied in theory by some
during the first attempts at test tube baby production. It was argued
that only God could create; which, of course, is philosophically (and
theologically) correct. 21 But Thomistic philosophy demonstrates that
it is the hum an soul which God immediately creates, and this soul
informs the matter which was derived from pre-existing m atter. Now,
if unaided nature in the early embryon ic stages so arranges the matter
to provide another joined or disjoined individual t 9 the previously
existing individual (twinning), how does this negate the individuality
of a previously existing human being? The one remains. The second
begins to liv e, having had its material existence potentially in the
former as in a parent cell. If God infuses a human soul into the first
isolated matter, why not in t h e second and newly isolated matter?
4) "Person": individual of human species.

Philosophically, individuals do not exist only in the human species
but in every other material species in nature. However, among all t he
other species besides man , no individual is called a " person." Individual trees, dogs, rocks, etc., are not referred to as "persons" or the
group as " people. " The term " person," even according to common
knowledge is reserved for an "individual of a rational nature." It is
also quite evident that the individual m ember possessing the rational
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nature must not always be acting rationally for one to be a person. If
this were true, then immature children, sleeping adults, anesthetized
patients, etc., would all cease to be persons; it suffices for an individual to belong by nature to the human species. Such a state occurs at
the moment of fertilization: the individual zygote is, in essence, a
living being of a human nature. A child has been conceived.
These various notions which philosophy employs in its definition of
the "person" repeatedly surfaced and were also confirmed in the subcommittee's report. "We find that the fourteenth amendment
embodies the sanctity of human life and that today the government
must affirm this ethic by recognizing the 'personhood' of all human
beings. Earlier we found, based upon scientific examination, that the
life of each human being begins at conception. " 22 Briefly, personhood begins with each human life at conception.
While discussing the "legal effect of S158," the subcommittee
repeated its position on "personhood." "Now the findings of S158
would appear to bring the question of personhood of unborn children
within the holdings of Levy v. Louisiana, in which the Court stated
that individuals who are 'humans, live, and have their being' cannot be
'nonpersons' " (391 U.S. 68, 70 [1968] ).23
Whenever the witnesses for the minority view addressed the question of the "person" or "personhood," they did it also under the legal
or scientific basis.
From the legal standpoint, the testimony centered around what the
Supreme Court already had judged in Roe v. Wade or proposed the
question as to which legal authority belonged the jurisdiction to determine the meaning and extent of personhood. 24
From the scientific standpoint, whether human life was considered
to have begun at conception or not, it was generally conceded not to
be within the realm of the physical sciences to determine "personhood."25
A certain amount of exactness and integrity is conveyed in the
latter approach. Generally, those involved in the physical sciences,
specifically in embryology, are aware that the only certitude they have
depends upon the evidence which their science presents either immediately to the senses or mediately by way of technological instruments.
Once anyone leaves this area of concreteness, other sciences must be
enlisted - sciences valid in themselves and capable of organizing the
related scientific facts.
The subcommittee had more than sufficient scientific facts and
testimony about the beginning of individual human life to make its
own philosophizing relatively easy. The conclusions which
immediately presented themselves to the subcommittee agreed with
the major teachings in the "philosophy of man" on the beginning of
individual human life. This individual is a person who is essentially the
same from fertilization throughout all its stages of life.
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